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I.

INTRODUCTION
Over the years it has been interesting to try to identify developing

trends or theories in the area of oil and gas law. Some trends originate in
other areas of the law and have migrated toward the oil and gas arena.
Certain of these trends or theories are developed out of thin air by ingenious
attorneys representing parties who feel aggrieved. Still others arise as a result
of new forms of technology and their impact on law and society. Trends even
evolve from the political arena in response to direct or indirect claims of
constituents.
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Early forecasting o f a trend or theory and the path of its developm ent
or dem ise is akin to gazing into a crystal ball or reading tea leaves.
Unquestionably the birth of a trend causes uncertainty in the law and
therefore an increased level of risk in the investment community. This paper
is an attempt to identify several possible trends and surmise whether they will
result in smooth sailing or a tidal wave of change for the oil and gas industry,
including attorneys, landmen and the investment community.

W hile there are a number of potential trends or developing theories,
many of which I probably have not identified, the following are som e of the
potential developing trends. A t this point a caveat is in order. This paper’s
purpose is to raise questions and give a range of potential answers and/or
problems. As you will see, this paper is general in nature and is not intended
to be a treatise or law journal article. W hile it may seem so, the purpose of
this paper is not to give the "correct" answer at this point in the evolution of
these trends.

II.

GEOPHYSICAL AND GEOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS AND
THEIR IMPACT UPON THE LAW - TRESPASS, CO TENANCY,
POOLING. AND THE DOMINATE MINERAL ESTATE__________
Advances in geophysical and geological technology over the last decade

have been substantial. Geophysical "exploration" takes many forms including
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seism ic, airborne or satellite technology. It’s purpose is to provide information o f the structural and stratigraphic com position o f the earth. As you will
note, I have categorized geophysical activities as "exploration". They are no
m ore than another way of exploring for oil and gas. H owever, geophysical
operations generally do not determ ine whether there is oil or gas present. It
is still necessary that a w ell be drilled.

The m ost fam iliar geophysical operations are seism ic operations.
Seism ic techniques generally involve the generation o f energy near the surface
which reflects subsurface features. They involve either the drilling o f shot
holes with sm all amounts of explosives or vibrioses with the energy source
com ing from a truck-mounted vibrator. The reflection o f these sound waves
is recorded and in many instances computer enhanced. W hile seism ic has
been around for years, it has only been within the last score of years that the
quality has improved dramatically through the use of three dim ensional (3-D )
seism ic. This m ovem ent toward 3-D seism ic often requires larger acreage
blocks and m ultiple lines of seism ic. Actual use o f the land is required in
both regular seism ic or vibrioses.

Other geology or geologic engineering advancements such as fracking
(hydraulic fracturing) or horizontal drilling have given rise to new questions
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in the area o f oil and gas law. Each o f these techniques is another form of
"exploration".

Fracking is the forcing at high pressure o f a fracking m aterial (sand or
chemical gel) into the potentially productive formation to increase the ability
of the formation to produce. Horizontal drilling is self-explanatory - it is the
drilling of a wellbore within and horizontal to the producing formation.

The legal questions arising from the use of each of these "exploration"
tools are much the same as those which have historically been present. Who
has the right to do what, where and when and whose permission is needed
and what is the state’s role through its regulatory agencies?

There is very little, if any, legal authority concerning advanced
technologies like 3-D seism ic, horizontal drilling and fracking. See Kendor
P. Jones, Restrictions, on Access and Surface/Subsurface Trespass Involving
Exploration and Production Technologies, in 40 Rockv Mt. Min. L. Inst. 20-1
(1994).

There is, however, general law developed earlier in this century

dealing with older technology. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden. 241 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1957); W ilson v. Texas Co.. 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Ct. App.
1951). This law is a patchwork involving the interweaving of the theories of
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trespass, co-tenancy, pooling, and the dominant mineral estate. Appendix A
to this paper is a visual overview of examples.

The courts have generally held that the mineral owner, not the surface
owner, has the right to conduct exploration activities whether geophysical or
geological. 1 Eueene Kuntz. A Treatise On the Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2
(1987). G enerally courts have stated that the right of geophysical exploration
is a valuable right which belongs to the mineral estate and that the owner of
these rights has an action to protect them. Id. at § 3.2(d)(1), at 91. However,
the courts have also generally held that no relief is available where there has
been no physical trespass and courts have had great difficulty in determining
the nature and measure of damages. Id. at § 12.7, at 348; Kendor P. Jones,
Restrictions On Access and Surface/Subsurface Trespass Involving Exploration and Production Technologies, in 40 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 20-1, 20-28
(1994). A key question has and should continue to be whether there was a
physical trespass on the land.

At this point you might ask what is new about this situation?

The

answer is the way the actual gathering of the information occurs on the
ground (See Appendix A ), the scope of the information revealed and the
suggestion by som e that the courts look beyond the limitations of prior law to
"create a right". These new rights are generally in the nature of analogies to
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the law of trade secrets, wrongful appropriation or interference with valuable
property rights. See generally Mark D . Christiansen, N ote, Oil and Gas:
Improper Geophysical Exploration - Filling In the Rem edial Gap. 32 Okla.
L. Rev. 903 (1979); James W. Griffin, N ote, Protectable Property Rights.
Trade Secrets and Geophysical Data After City of Northglen v. Grynberg, 71
Denv. U. L. Rev. 527 (1993); Robert J. R ice, Wrongful Geographical
Exploration. 44 Mont. L. Rev. 53 (1983); Slater, N ote, The Surrepitious
Geophysical Survey: An Interference With Prospective Advantage. 15 Pac.
L.J. 381 (1984); Thomas M. Warner, Jr., N ote, Oil and Gas: Recovery for
Wrongful Geophysical Exploration - Catching Up With Technology. 23
Washburn L J. 107 (1983). W hile there are law journal articles proposing
these arguments, until recently this author is not aware o f a case extending
these theories to geophysical or geological "exploration".

It is my understanding that a trial court judge in Texas in a case
entitled Burr Ranch v. BGM Airborne Services. Inc. has indicated that he
may rule based on one of these type theories that a landowner is entitled to
recovery for airborne geophysical surveys over his property.

With regard to fracking and horizontal drilling techniques I recommend
a very good discussion in 33 Washburn L. J. 492 (1994) by Jacqueline Lang
Weaver entitled The Future Course of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence; The
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Politics o f Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The Eighty-Six Percent Factor. This
article discusses G eo Viking. Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co. 817 S.W.2d 357
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) rev'd per curiam, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. Apr. 22,1992),
per curiam decision withdrawn and writ of error denied as improvidently
granted, 839 S.W .2d 797 (Tex. 1992). This case involved a suit by Tex-Lee
against G eo Viking for failure to properly fracture a w ell and the concurrent
loss of oil as a result. This case and the discussion in the referenced article
certainly place into question what happens if fractures or horizontal drilling
invade an adjoining mineral estate owned or leased by others. Included in
this article is a discussion o f the policy, consequences and need for the
appropriate regulatory or legislative changes to encourage new or improved
technologies like horizontal drilling or fracturing. Other sources of information on horizontal drilling trends are Patricia A M oore, The Legal Implications of Horizontal Drilling, in 1991 Arkansas Natural Resources Law
Institute,

and Patricia A M oore, Horizontal Drilling - N ew Technology

Bringing N ew Legal and Regulatory Challenges, in 36 Rocky Mt, Min. L, Inst,
15-1 (1990).

Under a claim for trespass by fracking an adjoining owner, I assume,
would have difficulties with the proof of damages and proof of a physical
invasion. A valid defense in som e circumstances seem s to be the rule of
capture. However, after first examination the rule of capture may not be an
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adequate defense if physical invasion of others properties occurs. I refer you
to the old slant hole or directional drilling cases. See 1 Howard R. Williams
& Charles J. Meyers. Oil and Gas Law. § 227 (1990).

Up to this point the discussion has involved rights of the mineral
owner, and lessee/operator but has not addressed the rights of the surface
owner. As earlier stated the mineral estate is the dominate estate and has the
right to make reasonable use of the surface without payment to the surface
owner. 1 Eugene Kuntz. A Treatise On the Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2(a), at
87-88 (1987). While it has been custom and practice in the industry to pay
the surface owner for shot holes or surface access it has not been compelled
by law.

However, recently statutes have been enacted providing for the

possible rights of surface owners for use of the surface and seismic operations.
See Ark Code Ann. §§ 15-71-114, 15-72-213 and 214 and 15-72-203 (1994),
also see Debbie C. Fritsche, The Inner-Workings of the Arkansas Oil and Gas
Commission, in 1993 Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute concerning
some of these statutes and the Oil and Gas Commissions Rules (B-10, B-42).
With great deference to the authors of these statutes and the regulations,
many questions remain as to their application including their constitutionality.
Can the state force an owner to pay a third party for a right that he already
owns? D o these statutes or regulations attempt to do so? Is that a constitutional taking? Another interesting twist on the enactment of such statutes is
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the question of whether the entering of the state into the arena precludes a
mineral owner from exercising his rights with regard to unauthorized seismic
exploration across his minerals. That is, if the seismic company pays the
surface owner as arguably required by statute, does the fact that the statute
exists preclude the mineral owner, who has not given permission, from
recovery? A sort of preemption argument.

Pooling either voluntary or statutory, especially if inadequate,
necessarily have a bearing on "exploration" including the use of new
technology. For example in Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp., 664 S.W.2d 456 (Ark.
1984) the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that where a lease provided that a
well site within the same drilling unit as the lease premises would be
considered to be located upon the leased premises, a rig could be transported
across the leased premises to a well site which was located on an adjacent
tract in the same unit. See also Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 548 F. Supp. 1150, 75
O.&G.R. 85 (M.D. La. 1982) aff'd, 721 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1983). Although
the general rule is that there is no implied right to use the surface estate of
a leased tract to benefit operations on an adjacent or nearby tract, a valid
pooling or unitization order issued by state conservation agency will serve to
create such a right. 2 Bruce M. Kramer and Patrick H. Martin. The Law of
Pooling and Unitization § 20.06[1] (3d ed. 1990). Such a construction is also
supported by the fact that these orders are based on the states’ police powers,
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as w ell as by the fact that courts tend to favor conservation measures. If the
unit operator were not permitted to use unit lands, the purpose of the state
conservation order could not be effectuated. A particular problem arises
when an unleased tract is located within a forced pool unit. If the pooling or
unitization order did not, as a matter of law, confer upon the unit operator
the right to surface access and use of the lands located within the unit, the
operator’s use of an unleased owner’s land may constitute a trespass, possibly
exposing the unit operator to both actual and punitive damages. The courts
that have considered the issue hold that a pooling or unitization order serves
to insulate an operator from a trespass claim by an unleased owner who has
been force pooled. The question arises whether such statutes, regulations or
orders from a conservation agency will protect persons involved in the use of
enhanced technology. A problem pointed out in the W eaver article is the
lack of appropriate statutes, rules and regulations providing for the use of
enhanced technology.

Other authors note changes in the law concerning the use of the
surface estate in exploration.

John F. W elborn, Changes In the D om i-

nant/Servient Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estate, in 40
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 22-1 (1994); W illiam F. Blair, Surface Rights and
Conflicts: How Dominant is the Mineral Estate, in 1994 Eastern Mineral Law
Foundation Special Institute. Four Comers and G ood Intentions: Construing
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Property Rights Under Oil and Gas Instruments. The W elbom article places
emphasis on certain changes in federal law which have occurred. The author
and others have argued that the rights of the surface owner in reference to
the dominant mineral estate are changing and/or developing to give surface
owners more rights. However, I do not believe that the changes in these
federal rules and regulations should be so deem ed. They should be viewed
as a mineral owner placing restrictions upon itself and its lessees as to how
the mineral estate will be developed with due regard to the surface owner.
They do, however, show a relevance to the idea that society (as represented
by government) is giving additional consideration to restrictions on the
developm ent of minerals in favor of the surface owner. But see Part IV of
this paper on takings.

A few states, including Arkansas, have created a duty to restore the
surface.

The majority of jurisdictions hold that an oil and gas lessee or

mineral owner has no im plied obligation to restore the surface. However, the
Arkansas in Bonds v. Sanchez-O -B rien Oil and Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 91
O.&G.R. 11 (Ark. 1986) after recognizing the majority rule held otherwise.
See also Fox v Nally, 805 S.W.2d. 661 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) where the court
held that a damage release does not negate the duty to restore the surface.
Professors W illiams and Myers in their treatise state that there is no im plied
duty of surface restoration as a general matter. 1. Howard R. W illiams and
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Charles J. Myers, Oil and Gas Law. § 218.12 (1990). It may be argued that
the breach of a regulatory order or statute creates a separate ground for
recovery when recovery would otherwise not be available.

However,

application of these cases to seismic operations where the use of surface is
limited and short-termed is questionable. If the seismic operation in fact
created no damage (surface is restored and no collateral damage occurs), then
what is the surface owner’s basis for recovery? The surface owner may argue
for recovery under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-72-213 and 214 and/or 15-71-114
or 15-72-203 (1994), providing for a surface owner’s lien for damages caused
by operator neglect, a surface owners claim for damages caused by operator
neglect, permit required for field seismic operations, and notice to surface
owners. However, do these statutes create a cause of action if there are no
damages? This and other questions remain unanswered.

III.

OPERATING AGREEMENTS, FARMOUT AGREEMENTS,
DRILLING AND OTHER CONTRACTS AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR PROVISIONS TREND OR NO TREND________________________________
The contractual agreements generally used in the oil and gas industry

are classified as operating agreements, farmout agreements and drilling
contracts along with miscellaneous other type contracts. The development of
the law as it relates to these contracts over the last ten (10) years is difficult
to categorize. As one can imagine the cases go all over the place with
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different results on sim ilar issues depending on the jurisdiction and court. If
there is a trend over the past five (5) years the trend would be classified as
two-pronged. The trend over the m ore recent years appears to be that courts
are going to enforce the contracts as written, with lim itation. The lim itation
som e courts seem to be applying is that in certain instances they will try to
give relief to parties who, when entering contracts, knew they either did not
intend to, or could not, carry them out. In my humble opinion the lim itation
applied by the courts in these cases is not appropriate.

These cases deal with a variety o f operating agreem ents, farmout
agreem ents and drilling contract provisions including the indem nity provisions
of the operating agreem ent, the COP AS accounting statem ent, performance
of drilling contracts and others.

A good illustration o f this trend is exem plified by two cases from
Texas. Stine v. M arathon O il Co. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992) and Dresser
Industries, Inc. v Page Petroleum . Inc., 853 S.W .2d 505 (Tex. 1993). In Stine
a non-operator sued the operator, Marathon, for breach o f the operating
agreem ent. The lower court awarded substantial dam ages to the non-operator
based on breach o f the operating agreem ent by the operator.

The Fifth

Circuit Court o f A ppeals construed the exculpatory clause found in the
operating agreem ent which protects the operator for all action undertaken

14

except those which amount to "gross negligence or willful misconduct". The
Fifth Circuit stated that the protection extended under the JOA to the
operator includes all action performed under the JOA including administrative and accounting matters. Stine represents that portion of the trend stated
as "courts will enforce the contract as written".

However, Dresser Industries represents the "with limitations" portion
of the trend enunciated above. In Dresser at issue were the provisions of a
drilling contract and certain releases. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, holding that the fair notice requirements (consumer
protection legislation) applicable to indem nity/exculpatory agreements
applied. This case appears to mean that consumer type protection including
large or color print or type size are important in joint operating agreements
and drilling contracts if you want the exculpatory provisions or releases to
apply.

In criticizing the holding in this case and the underlining anti-indemnity
legislation I do so without the knowledge of Texas practitioners who have a
better feel for their meaning and interpretation. See Jeanmarie B. Tade,
Texas Indemnity, Anti-Indemnity and Contribution Law, in 43 S.W. Inst. 7-1
(1992).

It appears to this writer that while consumers may need such

protection, persons engaged in the day to day business of the oil and gas
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industry such as drilling contractors, operators and non-operators should be
bound by their contracts. They should not be relieved because the provisions
which impact them are not in bold or colored print.

Courts differing approaches to such issues are exem plified by Caddo
Oil Company, Inc. v. O’Brien 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990); Exxon Corporation
v Crosby-Mississippi Resources. Ltd. 775 F.2d 969 (S.D . Miss. 1991), a ff'd in
part. 1995 WL 305 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 1995); Texstar North Am erica, Inc. v.
Ladd Petroleum Corp., 809 S.W.2d 672, (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied Oct.
9, 1991; Petrocana, Inc. v. Amargo , 577 So.2d 274 (La. 1991); Davis v. TXO
Production Corp., 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991); versus Texas Oil & Gas
Corporation v. Hawkins Oil & Gas. Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1 9 8 4 ).

A ll of the cases first set out above enforce the operating agreement or
contract as written.

These cases, in one form or the other, are on the

opposite end of the spectrum from Hawkins with which many of you are
familiar. In Hawkins the Arkansas Supreme Court said that there was som e
sort of "fiduciary" duty between an operator and a non-operator. If the court
in Hawkins wanted to hold as it did it should have done so on other grounds
rather than establish a fiduciary duty between operators and non-operators.
The Hawkins case seem s to be out of the main stream of cases dealing with
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operating agreements and is another example of the "limitations" placed upon
the above theory.

Authors writing on the area of joint operating agreements are all over
the spectrum. Many do not espouse imposing a fiduciary duty, especially
where the m odel form JOA is used. See Stine. Exxon. Ernest Smith, The
Purpose and Effect o f the Operating Agreement, in 32 Rocky M t. Min. L.
Inst. 12-1 (1986), Lynn P. Hendrix & Staunton L. T. Golding, The Standard
of Care in the Operation of Oil and Gas Properties: D oes the Operator Owe
a Fiduciary Duty to Non-Operators?, in 44 S.W. Inst. 10-1 (1993). However,
other writers state that there should be a fiduciary duty. See Susan Webber
Wright, Fiduciary D uties Arising From Ownership of Oil and Gas Interests.
1985 Arkansas Natural Resource Law Institute. Still others are uncertain of
any conclusion with all the confusion arising from the various cases. See
David M. Jones, Nonoperators Versus the O perator-Are Nonoperators
Becom ing More W illing To Sue Operators?, in 43 S.W. Inst. 10-1 (1992) for
a good general discussion.

Courts that find a fiduciary relationship tend to focus on the existence
of certain attributes which would tend to indicate that it is a joint venture or
a partnership. The problem with these cases and articles is they often ignore
the actual terms of the agreement between the parties. Where a m odel form
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JOA is used these authors and courts com pletely ignore the provisions which
provide that it is not a joint venture or partnership, the risk o f loss provisions,
the exculpatory provisions and all of the other matters specifically addressed
in the operating agreement. Such an approach avoids the intention of the
parties as exhibited by the agreement, even where the agreement deals with
the specific problem. In addition these cases and articles also seem to ignore
the fact that the parties to the JOA may have originally been competitors or
adversaries.

They may have been integrated and/or forced under an

operating agreement by competitive factors.

The point being, either the

agreement should be enforced as written or the courts should come up with
som e m ethod of recovery based on something other than changing the theory
of liability or the relationship of the parties.

Many of the old cases which find that a joint venture existed did not
involve a form JO A . Therefore those courts were left with the job of figuring
out if, as a m atter-of-fact, there was a joint venture. One can obviously see
the problem with applying these old joint venture decisions to cases where a
form joint operating agreement was negotiated.

Many times one of the

included provisions in the JOA is that it is not a joint venture. The reason for
this is no one wants to be an operator if they are going to be placed under a
fiduciary obligation which requires them to act against their own best interest
or to be a guarantor of results. The obvious inference being if a state wants
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to discourage people from being operators then do as the Arkansas Supreme
Court did. If a state wants to encourage people to becom e operators, by
letting the parties know their agreements are binding and can be depended
upon, then do as other states.

A second or collateral theory which is present or derivative from the
Hawkins case and other cases seem s to be as follows. W here there is no basis
in law or the contract the court may im pose secondary or collateral duties on
an operator to achieve a desired result.

Both the Hawkins and Dresser

Industries cases are examples of this.

Claims of bad faith in operating agreement and contract litigation are
becom ing more and more prevalent. See generally Mark Pennington, Punitive
Dam ages for Breach of Contract: A Core Sample From the D ecisions of the
Last Ten Years. 42 Ark. L.R. 31 (1989), [Citing D elta R ice M ill. Inc. v.
General Foods Corp., 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (Interpreting Arkansas
Law)]. This appears to be a third trend among the cases. The following
situations, which I categorize as double bad faith, do not arise from the above
judicial decisions but rather from other cases with which I am familiar.

Over the last ten years there have been a number of cases brought by
persons whom I classify as "bad actors". These cases typically involved a "bad
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actor" arguing that he is entitled to something, or doesn’t have to pay because
the operator was grossly negligent or mean or just didn’t do right. It is usually
alleged that the operator acted in bad faith thus entitling the "bad actor" to
certain advantages. The advantages are that by claiming bad faith they avoid
case law to the contrary, invoke equitable principles, claim punitive damages,
prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and the like.

Several examples are

pertinent. A ll of these are unreported cases which have terminated by som e
series o f events with no judicial decision being rendered.

In one case an operating agreement was entered into and, the operator
drilled the w ell as required.

Unfortunately the target zone was only

minimumly producible and the costs of a deep w ell were substantial. The
non-operator, being in financial difficulty, argued that the operator ruined or
destroyed the reservoir and did so in bad faith. This argument and others
were advanced even though the non-operator had promised to pay and had
in fact paid a minimal amount, but when he saw the results of the log and
core analysis he decided he would not pay any more.

The non-operator

argued for duties other than those set out in the operating agreement and
simply tried to avoid the exculpatory provisions of the JOA by arguing bad
faith. The party attempted to get punitive damages with the possibility of
prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and the like. The bad faith claim in this
instance was couched in terms of gross negligence and intentional misconduct.
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After several years of litigation making the same type of claims against several
operators on different wells, the non-operator eventually went bankrupt.

A second example deals with the sale of producing properties. The
"bad actor" had, on several occasions when companies sent out sale letters
claimed to be interested. H e submitted the high bid and when he couldn’t
produce the money and fulfill the terms of the buy-sell agreement, claimed
that the seller breached the contract in bad faith. The "bad actor" claimed a
right to either get the properties for free or extract monetary damages. Such
a claim obviously delays the ultimate sale of the properties and causes
additional losses resulting from litigation costs, even if settled.

These are two situations which have occurred which are brought to
your attention so that you may be prepared if they arise.

IV.

THE REAWAKENING OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
CLAUSE - PROPERTY OWNERS REVOLT______________________
A rapidly growing trend in the natural resource arena involves Article

V of the Constitution which prohibits governments from taking property without compensation. Article V of the Constitution provides "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation". In the last few
years growing resentment has developed among citizens, including companies
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and individuals as a result of the government’s taking their property through
laws and regulations, primarily environmental in nature.

In just the last

several months I have noticed no less than five articles in the W all Street
Journal detailing new foundations or groups of citizens banding together to
insist upon their Fifth Amendment Rights under the Constitution. These
groups generally appear to be private citizens with grievances against the
government for regulating their property into non-existence. The law as it
applies to this trend is undergoing a re-emergence.

This trend was last addressed by our U . S. Supreme Court in Lucus v
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) and D olan v. City of
Tigard. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994). A number of cases on the takings issue have
been decided by the Federal courts in recent years.

See Florida Rock

Industries. Inc. v. U nited States. 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) a ff'd in part and vacated
in part, 791 F.2d 893 (1986), and cert. denied. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,r 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). Two excellent
articles dealing with this trend are Martha Phillips Allbright and Thomas E.
R oot, Government Taking of Private Water Rights. 39 Rocky Mt. Min. Inst.,
20-1 (1993) and Mark L. Pollot, Making the Right Choices; Strategy. Tactics
and the Law In Property Rights Cases, in 40 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst., 1-1,
(1994).
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As a practical matter individual citizens are obviously becom ing sick
and tired of the arrogance of the government in trampling on their rights.
This government arrogance is reflected in a quote (and inference) out of the
Allbright and R oot article on page 20-4 as follows:

Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior, would replace the
concept of "multiple use" developed during the use-management
phase of public land law developm ent with a new concept, that
of "dominant use." His rationale is as follows: "Multiple U se
skirts the reality that in the new urbanizing west, there is no
longer enough space to accommodate every competing use on
every section of public domain."

The dominate idea behind this attitude is environmentalism has first
call on the land, and property rights owners be dammed.

The property

owner’s response has been, the Constitution says if you want to take my
property you have to pay for it. This attitude has been growing over the
recent years and has been aggravated by the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), local zoning ordinances and other environmental statutes. A
specific example is the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
(1985) with its impact on logging in the Northwest via the spotted owl. While
many are aware of the above "endangered" specie and others like the
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american burying beetle, the gopher tortus and the red cockaded woodpecker,
they are not aware that many hundreds of other species are in the process of
being classified endangered.

A lso in this web of regulation is the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1986), with its wetlands provisions, scenic
rivers acts and others. Specifically in the oil and gas area, many of you are
familiar with the delay and headache accompanying the discovery of the
american burying beetle at Fort Chaffee. In other states in this region you
find similar situations with the red cockaded woodpecker, the gopher tortus
and others. I am sure that there are likewise many other species in other oil
and gas producing states.

In the south you have the additional problems

arising from "wetlands" and their effect on operations. D o these statutes,
regulations and their enforcem ent constitute a taking o f private property
rights?

An interesting case along these lines out of Michigan is M iller Brothers
v. D ept. of Natural Resources. 513 N.W .2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). In this
case a regulatory agency would not allow a permit to drill wells in a 4500 acre
area because of the environment. As a result the operator brought suit under
the takings clause and was successful in obtaining a judgement in the amount
of 71 m illion dollars plus interest and attorney fees. The court reasoned that
by taking away the right to drill several prospects a takings had occurred. The
court then looking at the value of the potential reserves, found the state had
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taken tins value and was thus obliged to pay. On appeal this approach to the
calculation of damages (permanent vs temporary) was rejected but the takings
holding upheld.

Many of you are probably familiar with current litigation and/or
problems surrounding off-shore leases in Florida and off the east coast where
takings claims are involved. Another natural resource takings case is Tarrant
County Water Control and Improvement District Number One v. Haupt, Inc.
854 S.W.2d. 909 (Tex. 1993). In this case the local water district condemned
and flooded the surface of certain lands to create a reservoir for drinking
water. However, the water district did not condemn the mineral interest
under the lands and the mineral owners filed suit for inverse condemnation.
The Texas Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
there is a reasonable alternative for producing the minerals. If there is not
a reasonable alternative then inverse condemnation has occurred and the
mineral estate must be paid for.

This area of the law will continue to unfold with additional cases
pending before the U. S. Supreme Court and other courts as w ell as a new
congress possibly undertaking a reduction of government regulation.
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V. E N T E R PRISE LIABILITY - A CLAIM WITHIN A THEORY
An interesting concept is beginning to make rumblings in the natural
resources area. This theory is enterprise liability. There are topics on this
theory planned for the upcoming Eastern Mineral Law Foundation Annual
Institute.

See generally Timothy J. Gillick, The Essence of Enterprise

Liability, or the True M eaning of "We’re A ll In This Together”, 16 Forum 979
(1981); Tort Reform Symposium: Perspectives on the American Law
Institute’s Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury.
30 San D iego L. Rev. 213 (1993) for example. It is my understanding that this
theory is somewhat as follows.

If a person or people are injured then

everyone in the chain of commerce is responsible for that injury.

For

example, in the energy area, parties all the way from mineral owners through
exploration companies, producers, purchasers and end users could be
responsible for damages arising to parties anywhere in the chain of commerce.
This is no doubt an interesting societal/political claim. It will be interesting
to see if it develops. However, it seem s if everyone is liable in som e form or
fashion for everything that happens everywhere to anybody then we should all
have a cause of action against each other for everything and as a result
everything will washout. The only problem is that plaintiffs’ lawyers will own
1 /3 of all commerce.
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VI

ROYALTY ON TAKE OR PAY SETTLEMENTS OR CONTRACT
BUYDOW NS___________________________________________________
There is a pending trend of cases involving royalty owners claims to

proceeds on take or pay settlem ents or gas contract buy-downs. This type
claim was addressed in the Bruni decision out of Texas where the Texas
Supreme Court held that royalty owners were not entitled to relief. Killiam
Oil Company v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex Ct. App 1991) error denied sub
nom. Hurd Enterprises. Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App 1992).
The Frey decision out of Louisiana held that royalty owners are entitled to
part of the proceeds of take or pay claims or contract buy-downs. Frey v.
Am oco Production Co. 943 F. 2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991), withdrawn in part 951
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992), certifying questions to 603 So.2d 166 (La 1992). In
Arkansas Klein v. Jones. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992) ren’g denied Jan. 22,
1993, is ongoing and I will not report on it assuming that it will be reported
on under the recent developm ents part of the program later.

It is my

understanding that there are other cases pending or in the process of being
readied on this issue in other states.

It will be interesting to watch the

developm ent of these cases to see if there is a trend one way or the other.
In the meantime you may want to review these three decisions in order to be
better prepared.
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V I I .CONCLUSION
In junior high school one o f my teachers was fond o f saying "the first
sign o f intelligence is the ability to follow directions". My instructions were
to write and present a paper o f this type for the benefit of the audience. I
think I have follow ed the instructions and given you som ething useful. This
sam e teacher often follow ed her first statem ent with "the second sign of
intelligence is the ability to identify the question or problem". I believe I have
identified som e of the possible future trends and the problems they may cause
for the oil and gas industry be they landmen, attorneys, geophysical personnel,
or companys with investm ents in this industry.

This paper identifies five (5) potential legal trends concerning the oil
and gas industry. W hile this paper does not attempt to give you the correct
answer it does provide general legal principles to the extent they exist on
these areas.

H opefully each of us can take these general principles and

form ulate a proper application if the situation arises. In law school credit is
given for correctly identifying the question, the pertinent facts and the law,
even if the answer is wrong. U nlike law school, if we apply these principles
incorrectly I am sure the courts, with no hesitancy, will let us know.

428/paper.wew
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APPENDIX "A"

1. All

2. None

3. Surface - Yes, Minerals - No

4. Surface - Yes, Minerals - No
6. Surface - No, Minerals - Yes

5. Surface - Yes, Minerals - 1/2

